Turkish Studies Project Conference III:

The Ottoman Empire and World War I

16-20 May 2012

Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina

Organizers:

M. Hakan Yavuz (University of Utah); Edin Radušić (University of Sarajevo); Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu (Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi)

Contact:

Hakan Yavuz, University of Utah

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The Turkish Studies Project at the University of Utah and the University of Sarajevo are delighted to announce a jointly-organized three-day conference to examine the causes and the short and long-term socio-political impact of World War I (WWI) on the post-Ottoman spaces and on the formation of the modern nation-states. This conference is the third in a series initiated by the Turkish Studies Project at the University of Utah. The first conference, with a thematic focus on the Berlin Treaty of 1878, was held in April 2010, and an edited volume of the conference papers was published in August 2011. A second conference on the impact of the Balkan Wars took place in May 2011, and an edited volume is now being prepared for publication. Next year’s conference, the last in the series, will address the WWI and its short and long-term implications for the post-Ottoman spaces. The papers presented and discussed at this conference will be peer-reviewed and edited for publication. The conference will address the following broad themes in the context of the Ottoman empire: mobilization, ethnic/civic/religious nationalism, mass education, public opinion, modernity, modern warfare, (counter-)insurgency, decision-making processes under war conditions, popular legitimacy, nation-building, re-colonization, and memory. The International System and the Major European Powers The first section of the conference will focus on the following questions: what were the major characteristics of the balance of power before WWI? How does neo-realism or constructivism explain the breakdown of the system? Did ideational factors such as religion, race, or ideology play any role in the alliance formation? Was the war inevitable or a war of choice? Was it possible for a multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire survive within an international system based on the (ethnic) national state? What was the impact of the principle of self-determination on the Ottoman state? Why did the major European powers use their resources to promote "rights and liberties" in the Ottoman domain but vehemently suppressed the same principles in their own colonial domains? What were the policies of the major European powers toward the Ottoman state over reforms? This section will consider key factors and principles in the international system leading up to WWI, and identify its particular bearing on the Ottoman empire: • The assassination of the Austrian Archduke and heir apparent, Franz Ferdinand, by a Serb, Gavrilo Princip, in Sarajevo, triggering tensions that led to an Austro-Hungarian invasion into Serbia, which activated its alliance with Russia. • The German failure to reach a renewal of its agreements with Russia, or get Britain to join its alliance with Austro-Hungary and Italy in the late 19th century, leading to the Triple Entente between Britain, France and Russia in 1907 in light of German naval expansion at sea. • The unilateral Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, causing an embarrassment for Russia and adding incentive for a more aggressive approach. • Russia’s interest in seeing the Ottoman empire dissolve due to its interest in access to the Mediterranean through control of the Black Sea and critical straits (Dardanelles, Bosphorus), leading the Ottoman empire to side with Germany and finding itself in conflict with the British and the French. • The German support of pan-Islamism, and its impression that the caliph would be in a position to lead a global Muslim insurrection against Britain and Russia, creating a miscalculation of force. • The questions surrounding the reasons for which the Ottoman empire entered WWI: How was the Ottoman decision-making influenced by the capitulations, diplomatic isolation, the forced Armenian reforms of 1914, and the Russian demands? Was there room for human agency considering the structural conditions in the decision to enter war? Was going to war a national struggle for survival, as Ottoman intellectuals perceived it following the defeat in the Balkan Wars, and an expression of hope to protect what was left in Anatolia and Syria/Iraq, or did the empire have a choice to remain neutral and was acting out of ambition to gain lost territories? • The Aftermath of WWI, which left a persistent legacy in terms of shaping memory, institutions, frontiers and political positions, involves significant residual effects on the post-Ottoman landscape. The Balkans • What do Balkan historiographies tell us about the causes and consequences of the War? What types of questions are raised? What were the legacies of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) Did these political legacies turn into instrument of mobilization and desire for revenge? What were the dominant intellectual discourses in the Balkans on Islam, the Ottoman empire and the Turks? • The Balkan decision-making, analyzing the channels through which voices were articulated, with an emphasis on intellectual discourse and the public sphere. • The Balkan Muslims, considering their significance for the Austrians who sought to have them embrace Austrian occupation and administration of former Ottoman territory such as Kosovo and Shkoder, and their position in the midst of the new waves of religious and ethnic cleansing that shaped politics in the region. Anatolia After the ethnic cleansing of Muslims and Turks in the Balkans, the question was: will the Ottoman Empire be confined to Anatolia or will it disappear? This section will focus on the following four key questions: (a) how did the loss of the Balkans and the treatment of Muslims shape public opinion before the War? How did war conditions shape the policies of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) towards the non-Muslim minorities? (b) More specifically, was the fate of the Armenian community reflective of advance planning and organization on the part of the CUP? Had the deportation been part of the CUP’s intentions before the First World War, or was it the option of last resort exhausting efforts to cooperate with the Armenians? What were the major faultlines within the Armenian community? In short, if Ottoman war policies in fact evolved in response to the changing conditions of the war, were there incremental radicalization policies against the Armenian communities? In a stricter sense of causality-to what extent was the decision to deport the Armenians a function of Turkish nationalist ideology, or was it a response to security concerns? (c) How did ordinary Muslims gel mobilized? What was the dominant public attitude towards the state’s policies in early 1915? To what extent did other factors such as epidemic disease and hunger affect the calamities in Anatolia? (d) Did the war lead to a "rebirth" of a new nation with institutions? What explains the Ottoman army’s "snail's pace" movement in Anatolia? When and how did the empire’s Muslim elite define Anatolia as the new homeland? How did the historiography of the War come to be shaped in the Turkish Republic, and how did the narrative about the War start being disseminated among the Turks? • The consequences of the loss in the Balkans and the ethnic cleansing of Turks there, in terms of their influence on public opinion in Anatolia before the war and the attitudes there toward non-Muslims minorities, especially with the decision to deport. • The leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), examining the extent to which it was in touch with realities on the ground in Anatolia, and whether this leadership captured and represented the hearts and thoughts of the Muslims in the land. • The security concerns in Anatolia, looking at the degree to which fears of collapse in light of the changing conditions of the war may have led to radicalizations of policies against the Armenian communities as defense mechanism. • The Turkish nationalist ideology, evaluating the role it played in setting Armenians apart, and whether it has a causal relationship with their fate, and exploring the measure of religious sentiments involved in Turkish national identity. • Comparability, juxtaposing the Armenian episode with the Greek, Albanian, Circassian, and Kurdish cases during World War I. • The considerations behind the military decisions made in Anatolia, seeking to explain the Ottoman army’s "snail's pace" movement in Eastern Anatolia, Enver Pasha decision to launch the Sarıkamış front against Russia, and the role of the Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa before and during the war. Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) • The Caucasian perspective, forming an understanding of the factors that led to WWI and its implications through Caucasian historiographies and the curriculum of these nation-states, and determining the predominant discourse in such works. • The Russian perspective, looking for ties between the environment created with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the development of Caucasian "national historiographies," and identifying the Russian policy in the Caucasus during WWI. • The Ottoman perspective, examining the sense of threat created by its perception of Russian strategy, the social and psychological reasons for the Ottoman fear of Russia, and the impact this fear had on Ottoman war decisions. The Arab Provinces • What do Arab historiographies tell us about the causes and consequences of the WWI? The Arab perspective, studying the existing material on the experience of WWI through the manner in which the war is taught in Arab nation-states, and through Arab historiographies, to the extent that a unified methodological theme may be found in these works. • The degree of Arab loyalty to the Ottoman empire, inquiring whether the policies of the CUP toward the Arabs had a considerable influence on the unfolding of the war, and, in case the Arab disillusionment with the empire had not already passed the point of repair, whether sufficient effort was invested in getting the populations of the Arab provinces to support the Ottoman cause. • The plans for the region, recognizing the impact of different visions for the region on the eve of WWI, be it Western political and economic interests, the embryonic Arab nationalist movement, or the increasing Jewish immigration to Palestine. • The consequences of WWI, examining the changes in the region following the conclusion of the war, in terms of the Western attempt to sort between competing interests and shape the map of the Arab Middle East post Ottoman rule, and the role the state-system play in the region’s instability. * * * The organizers will provide accommodation and meals for the duration of the conference but we would be grateful if you could approach your own institution in the first instance to cover travel costs. If travel cost cannot be obtained from scholar’s home institution, the conference will provide partial support for travel. Participants should plan to arrive at Sarajevo airport on May 16. The conference will begin on the morning of May 17, and end in the late afternoon of May 20. Please reply to this e-mail as soon as possible, simply informing us whether or not you will be able to attend. Then, we would like to receive the title of your paper and a 250 word abstract by December 15th, 2011, and a first draft by March 15th, 2012; this will enable us to put the papers on a dedicated website before the conference starts. The papers will be edited and published in the course of 2013. We very much hope that you will be able to participate.